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HOW THE SEPARATION OF POWERS DOCTRINE SHAPED THE EXECUTIVE 
 




 This Article examines the debates of the Founders over the separation of powers doctrine 
as it relates to the executive branch. After surveying the experience in the colonies and under the 
post-Revolutionary state constitutions, it analyzes the relevant issues at the Constitutional 
Convention. Rather than focusing on abstract discussions of political theory, the article examines 
specific decisions and controversies in which separation of powers was a concern. The Article 
offers a detailed recounting of those debates. 
 At the Convention, separation of powers arose most prominently in the arguments over 
nine issues: choosing the Executive, permitting the Executive to stand  for second term, 
removing the Executive, devising the Executive veto, requiring legislative advice and consent for 
executive appointments, authorizing the Executive to grant reprieves and pardons, and making 
the Vice President the President of the Senate. 
 The Article demonstrates that much of the discussion centered on allocating power 
between the Legislative and Executive branches and thus really amounted to a struggle over 
defining the nascent office of the Executive. It thus offers the historical background for today’s 
debates over separation of powers. For the Founders, separation of powers served not as a rigid 





 On July 17, 1787, the Constitutional Convention continued its discussion on how long the 
Executive should serve in office.1 At this point in the proceedings, the deputies had voted to 
make the Executive eligible for re-election, and the question was whether his term of office 
should be seven years. Dr. James McClurg (Va.) offered the perhaps surprising motion that the 
President should serve “during good behavior,” that is, potentially for life.2 Perhaps even more 
surprising is the vote on his motion. Although six state delegations voted against it, four 
                                                 
* Professor of Law, Villanova University School of Law. 
1. See JAMES MADISON, NOTES OF DEBATES IN THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 306-13 (W.W. 
Norton 1987) (1840) [hereinafter MADISON’S NOTES]. For a synopsis of the proceedings at the Convention, see 
HAROLD H. BRUFF, BALANCE OF FORCES: SEPARATION OF POWERS IN THE ADMINISTRATIVE STATE 21-29 (2006). 
 
2. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 310. 
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delegations voted in favor.3  
 The close vote might seem particularly surprising given the country’s colonial history 
with executives. To be sure, a number of deputies thought the British Constitution offered an 
ideal form of government, but not one appropriate for this country, at least not yet. For example, 
Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) could proclaim that “the British Government was the best in the 
world” and state that he “doubted much that any thing short of it would do in America.”4 He 
even 
 went so far as to state his opinion that “the people will in time be unshackled from their 
prejudices” against an elected monarchy.5 In contrast, Charles Pinckney (S.C.) declared an 
elected monarchy to be “a monarchy, of the worst kind;”6 however, he also stated his belief that 
the British Constitution was ”the best Constitution in existence, but “one that can not be 
introduced into this Country for many centuries”7 until an aristocratic class similar to the British 
peerage developed.8 
                                                 
3. See id. at 313. New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, and Virginia voted for the motion. Massachusetts, 
Connecticut, Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Georgia voted against it. The New Hampshire 
delegation did not arrive at the Convention until July 23. See id. at 347. Rhode Island refused to send a delegation. 
See James Madison, Preface to Debates in the Convention: A Sketch Never Finished nor Applied, in MADISON’S 
NOTES, supra note 1, at 12-13 (noting Rhode Island’s fear that a revision of the Articles of Confederation would 
reduce its ability to tax consumers from neighboring states who purchased goods imported through its ports). 
 
4. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 134 (also stating that his opinion of the British government was 
supported “by the opinions of so many of the wise & good”). 
 
5. Id. at 137. 
6. Id. at 45. 
7.  Id. at 182. 
8. See id. at 182-87 (arguing that the socioeconomic equality of the American people would greatly impede 
this development and thus require the country to create a governmental structure different than that of Britain); see 
also id. at 46 (Edmund Randolph (Va.)) (referring to the British government as “that Excellent fabric,” but arguing 
that “the fixed genius of the people of America required a different form of Government”); id. At 56-57 (John 
Dickinson (Del.) (stating he considered a “limited Monarchy . . .as one of the best Governments in the world,” but 
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 George III, however, was an unpopular monarch. According to the Declaration of 
Independence, “[t]he history of the present King of Great Britain is a history of repeated injuries 
and usurpations, all having in direct object the establishment of an absolute tyranny over these 
states.”9 And, as Benjamin Franklin pointed out, there had been many bad colonial governors.10  
This unpopularity of executives greatly influenced the drafters of the post-Revolutionary state 
constitutions, who, as one historian puts it, made the executives “essentially figureheads.”11 In 
the words of Madison, [t]he Executives of the States are in general little more than Cyphers; the 
legislatures omnipotent.”12 
 Given this history, the support that McClurg’s motion received might seem perplexing 
unless the reader consults a  footnote in James Madison’s notes. Madison tells us that McClurg 
probably sought merely “to enforce the argument against the re-eligibility of the Executive 
Magistrate, by holding out a tenure during good behaviour as the alternative for keeping him 
independent of the Legislature.”13 He further discloses that no more than three or four of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
not suitable for this country because of the lack of a “House of Nobles”) (emphasis in original).  
 
9. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). 
10.  See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 601. As one historian has observed, “[o]ne legacy of colonial 
politics was a deep distrust of executives . . . .” DONALD S. LUTZ, THE ORIGINS OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONALISM 
148 (1988). In the American colonies, the popularly elected legislatures had significant power over the governors, 
who were mostly appointed by the King.. The legislatures controlled financial appropriations as well as the militias. 
Moreover, in most colonies, there was no upper house populated by an aristocracy that might ally itself with the 
governor. Yet, the governors had social status and enjoyed the support of the British military, particularly in the 
form of the British navy. See id. at 147-48. 
 
11. LUTZ, supra note 10, at 148. 
12. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 312. For a summary of the development of the executive office in 
the first state constitutions emphasizing the complexity of the deliberations, see WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDEOLOGY AND THE MAKING OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN THE 
REVOLUTIONARY ERA 271-75 (Rita & Robert Kimber trans., Univ. Of North Carolina Press 1980) (1973). 
 
13. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 310 n.*. Madison had an additional reason for giving aid to Dr. 
McClurg. McClurg was a friend of Madison’s and “though possessing talents of the highest order, was modest & 
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deputies truly favored a lifetime term and may not have supported the concept in the end.14 
According to Madison, a number of the affirmative voted “probably had it chiefly in view to 
alarm those attached to a dependence of the Executive on the Legislature, and thereby facilitate 
some final arrangement of a contrary tendency.”15 
 Underlying this debate was a concern over separation of powers. As Madison noted, 
“[a]n independence of the three great departments of each other, as far as possible, and the 
responsibility of all to the will of the community seemed to be generally admitted as the true 
basis of a well constructed government.”16 With respect to the relevance of the separation of 
powers doctrine to this debate, Madison pointed to a particular reason for endorsing a 
sufficiently long  term of office for the Executive. He thought it necessary to insure a strong 
counterweight to the Legislature and thus secure a stable government: “Experience had proved a 
tendency to throw all power into the Legislative vortex. . . . If no effectual check be devised for 
restraining the instability and encroachments of the latter, a revolution of some kind or other 
would be inevitable.”17 
 The debate over Dr. McClurg’s motion, then, was a debate between those believing that 
the Executive should be little more than an secretary to the Legislature and those believing it 
should be a separate, vital branch of the government. Given the debate’s background of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
unaccustomed to exert them in public debate.” Madison’s support “was meant to aid in parrying the animadversions 
likely to fall on the motion of Dr. McClurg.” Id. at 311 n†. 
 
14. See id. at 313 n*.  
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Id. at 312. Madison uses the same metaphor in The Federalist to argue the need for checks and 
balances: “The legislative department [in the states] is every where extending the sphere of its activity, and drawing 
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American experience with monarchs, weak or unaccountable executives, and powerful state 
legislatures, it is easy to understand why establishing a strong national Executive proved to be 
such a struggle. 
 This debate suggested no ill reflection on George Washington, presumably the first 
President. However, it did indicate apprehension about the more distant future. Benjamin 
Franklin observed, “[t}he first man put at the helm will be a good one. No body knows what sort 
may come afterwards. The Executive will always be increasing here, as elsewhere, till it ends in 
a Monarchy.”18 Franklin thus iterated a prominent theme of the era, that of corruption.19 A 
corrupt Executive could destroy the American enterprise. 
 By the time of the Convention, Americans had moved away from the mixed government 
model of the British Constitution and accepted the doctrine of separation of powers.20 By 1776, 
                                                                                                                                                             
all power into its impetuous vortex.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, at 333 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961).  
 
18. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 65-66. 
19. In should be no surprise that the proponents of the Constitution were obliged to defend the document 
against arguments that it would foster corruption. In The Federalist, the theme of corruption arises nine times. See 
THE FEDERALIST, supra note 17, at 141-41 (NO. 22 (Hamilton) discussing the threat of corruption by foreign 
nations); at 376-77 (NO. 55 (Madison) arguing that a small House of Representatives of 65 delegates would not be 
susceptible to corruption); at 377 (NO. 55 (Madison) arguing that constitutional checks and the positive aspects of 
human nature limit the possibility of the President and the Senate making appointments to government positions in a 
corrupt manner); at 418 (NO. 62 (Madison) arguing that the need for the two houses in the legislature to act 
concurrently serves as a check on corrupt legislative conduct); at 437-38 (NO. 64 (Jay) arguing that the need for the 
President and two-thirds of the Senate to concur in the making of a treaty serves to prevent the making of treaties for 
corrupt purposes); at 459-60 (NO. 68 (Hamilton) arguing that the procedure for electing the President involves so 
many individuals that it  makes corruption of the process extremely difficult and thus highly unlikely); at 505-06 
(NO. 75 (Hamilton) arguing that requiring the concurrence of both the President and the Senate to make treaties 
serves as a check on corruption); at 514 (No. 76 (Hamilton) arguing that the ability of a President to corrupt the 
Senate is impracticable because he would have to corrupt so large a number of Senators and because the 
Constitution provides checks on executive influence over the Senate); at 563 (NO. 83 (Hamilton) arguing that trial by 
jury serves as a check on corruption more in criminal cases than in civil cases). See THORNTON ANDERSON, 
CREATING THE CONSTITUTION: THE CONVENTION OF 1787 AND THE FIRST CONGRESS 166-72 (1993) (arguing that 
the anti-democratic biases in the Constitution stem in part from an effort to avoid corruption arising from the force 
of popular opinion). 
 
20. See M.J.C. VILE, CONSTITUTIONALISM AND THE SEPARATION OF POWERS 175-76 (2d ed. 1998). 
The English theory of mixed government held that the presence in the legislature of the three 
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the perceived primary purpose of the doctrine was to separate a state’s governmental branches in 
order to curb the executive power so that it could not corrupt the legislative and judicial 
branches.21 In the ensuing years, the founding generation recognized the importance of 
employing the doctrine to limit the powers of the legislative and judicial branches as well as the 
executive branch.22 In the words of historian Gordon Wood, [s]eizing upon this relatively minor 
eighteenth century maxim, the constitutional reformers in the years after 1776 exploited it with a 
sweeping intensity and eventually magnified it into the dominant principle of the American 
political system.”23 
 By 1787,  the date of Constitutional Convention, Madison and others argued that the 
primary purpose of the separation of powers doctrine was to prevent the legislative branch from 
amassing too much power, particularly at the expense of the Executive.24 For example, in 
debating the provision for Congressional override of a presidential veto, Madison noted: “It was 
an important principle in this & in the State Constitutions to check legislative injustice and 
incroachments. The Experience of the States had demonstrated that their checks are 
                                                                                                                                                             
states of monarchy, aristocracy, and people would prevent the constitution from degenerating into 
the corrupt forms of tyranny, oligarchy, or anarchy. By contrast, separation of powers emphasized 
the qualitatively distinct functions performed by the legislative, executive, and judicial 
departments of government. In securing the balance that both principles were expected to 
promote, the two theories could be regarded as complementary, alternative, or even rival 
explanations of the “matchless constitution” that Britons and Americans revered. 
JACK N. RAKOVE, ORIGINAL MEANINGS: POLITICS AND IDEAS IN THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 245-46 (1996) 
(emphases in original). 
 
21. See GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC 1776-1787, at 449 (1969). 
22. See id. 
23. Id. 
24. See id. at 337-338; see also id. at 326 (stating that separation of powers is a “fundamental principle of 
free government”).  
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insufficient.”25 And in The Federalist No. 48, Madison explained in detail why the Legislature 
had so much potential power and therefore why the proposed Constitution sought to limit its 
potential encroachments on the other branches: 
[W]here the legislative power is exercised by an assembly, which is inspired by a 
supposed influence over the people with an intrepid confidence in its own 
strength; which is sufficiently numerous to feel all the passions which actuate the 
multitude; yet not so numerous as to be incapable of pursuing all the objects of its 
passions, by means which reason prescribes; it is against the enterprising ambition 
of this department, that the people ought to indulge all their jealousy and exhaust 
all their precautions.26 
 Throughout the Convention, the debate over separation of powers included an extensive 
debate over what power the Executive should enjoy and the extent to which the Executive and 
Legislative branches could exercise power over one another. Of the twelve most explicit 
discussions of the separation of powers doctrine, nine referred to the issues of how to select the 
executive,27 what the executive’s term of office should be,28 how to remove a derelict 
Executive,29 or whether the Executive should exercise the veto power jointly with members of 
                                                 
25. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 629. 
26. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 17, at 334. Madison also noted two additional sources of a 
legislature’s power: (1) extensive constitutional powers that lack precise limits and thus permit encroachment on the 
other branches, and  (2) its access to “the pockets of the people,” and thus influence over the pecuniary rewards of 
those who serve in the other branches, which may create a dependence of those individuals on the legislature. See id. 
See also VILE, supra note 20, at 155-60 (describing the extensive power of state legislatures in the post-
Revolutionary period and the concerns that it raised). 
 
27. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 49, 326 & 588. 
28. See id. at 311-12 &313n.*. 
29. See id. at 56. 
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the Judiciary.30 
 For example, the method of selecting the Executive proved a controversial subject 
throughout the Convention. Although the initial proposal called for election by the Legislature,31 
the deputies eventually rejected it,32 because it could make the Executive dependent on that 
electing body.33 On the other hand, the nature of the executive veto over the legislature also 
generated considerable debate.34 
 The deputies to the Convention were practical, experienced  people35 and most 
recognized that a complete separation of powers was an impossibility. Beginning with the 
deliberations leading to the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780,36 American thinkers resuscitated 
                                                 
30. See id. at 80, 338 & 340. 
31. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 31. 
32. The Convention encountered great difficulty in settling on a method of selecting the Executive. On July 
19, the deputies voted in favor of an electoral system. See id. at 328. On July 24, they voted in favor of selection by 
the national legislature. See id. at 357. On July 26, they reaffirmed this decision and referred it and related 
provisions to the Committee of Detail. See id. at 372. On August 6, the Committee of Detail delivered its report, 
which continued to declare that the national legislature would select the Executive. See id. at 392. It also provided 
that the first national legislature would choose the first President. See id. at 395-96. On August 31, Gouverneur 
Morris successfully moved that the latter provision be stricken. See id. at 567. On the same day, the deputies voted 
to send to a Committee of Eleven “such parts of the Constitution as have been postponed, and such parts as have not 
been acted on . . . .” Id. at 569. On September 4, the Committee proposed that the Executive be chosen by electors 
from the states who would be appointed “in such manner as [each] Legislature may direct . . . .” Id. at 574. If no 
candidate received a majority or if more than one candidate received a majority, the Senate would make a selection 
from the five highest vote getters.. See id. On September 6, the deputies approved replacing the Senate with the 
House has the final decision maker.  See id. at 592. From this chronology, I have omitted an account of the many 
motions to refine the successful proposals and the unsuccessful motions to establish alternative methods of selection. 
 
33.  See id. at 576-77 (Gouverneur Morris summarizing reasons for employing an electoral college instead of the 
national legislature for selecting the Executive). 
 
34. See ANDERSON, supra note 19, at 140-43 (summarizing the issues in this debate). 
 
35. See FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION 117-216 (James H. Charleton, Robert G. Ferris & Mary C. Ryan eds., 
1986) (providing biographies of the deputies to the Convention). 
 
36. See VILE, supra note 20, at 162-68 (recounting those deliberations). 
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the seventeenth century British notion of checks and balances.37 As Madison later argued in 
Federalist No. 48, “unless these departments be so far connected and blended, as to give each a 
constitutional controul over the others, the degree of separation which the maxim [of the 
separation doctrine] requires as essential to a free government, can never in practice, be duly 
maintained.”38   
 This Article explores the debates of the Founders over separation of powers as it relates 
to the executive branch. After surveying the experience in the colonies and under the post-
Revolutionary state constitutions, it analyzes the relevant issues at the Constitutional 
Convention. Rather than focusing on abstract discussions of political theory, the article examines 
specific decisions and controversies in which separation of powers was a concern. At the  
Convention, the debate arose most prominently in the arguments over nine issues: choosing the 
Executive, permitting the Executive to be eligible for second term, removing the Executive, 
devising the Executive veto, requiring legislative advice and consent for executive appointments, 
authorizing the Executive to grant reprieves and pardons, and making the Vice President the 
President of the Senate. The Article demonstrates that much of the discussion centered on 
allocating power between the Legislative and Executive branches and thus really amounted to a 
struggle over defining the nascent office of the Executive. 
 
II. PRELUDE: COLONIAL GOVERNORS AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS 
 
                                                 
37. See id. at 135, 168-69 (describing the shift in thought). 
 
38. THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 17, at 332. 
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A. Colonial Governors 
 
  The reputation of America’s colonial governors did not further the argument for a strong 
national executive. At the Constitutional Convention, Benjamin Franklin noted the corrupt 
conduct of Pennsylvania’s colonial governor: 
The negative of the Governor was constantly made use of to extort money. No 
good law whatever could be passed without a private bargain with him. . . . When 
the Indians were scalping the western people, and notice of it arrived, the 
concurrence of the Governor in the means of self-defence could not be got, till it 
was agreed that his Estate should be exempted from taxation: so that the people 
were to fight for the security of his property, whilst he was to bear no share of the 
burden.39 
 Corruption flowed from the nature of British politics in the eighteenth century. The 
political structure was based on the power of the monarch--and the colonial governor– to bestow 
patronage and emoluments. As Gordon Wood has noted, the Americans “knew only too well 
how society was organized by intricate and personal ties to men of power.”40 
 The power of the governors over the colonial legislatures also raised the ire of 
Americans. A governor might dismiss officers from the militia if their votes in the legislature 
displeased him.41 If a legislature was compliant, a governor might decline to call a new election. 
                                                 
39. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 62.  See also id. at 601 (Franklin stating that “many bad governors” had 
been appointed in the past). 
 
40. WOOD, supra note 21, at 147. 
 
41. See id. at 157. 
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On the other hand, he might choose to rule on his own and neglect to call the body into session.42  
 Antipathy toward the colonial governors, however, resulted from more than the issue of 
corruption. In the royal colonies, the governor had ruled with the advice of a governor’s council, 
which consisted of the upper house of the legislature and which had a membership drawn from 
the colonial gentry, that is, the aristocratic class of society. This collaboration suggested a 
“mixed government” model far removed from a “separation of powers model” bottomed on a 
democratic base, which was gaining popularity in America.43 As one historian described the 
political situation: 
The Governor was not, of course, a true “executive officer.” He did execute the 
decisions of the colonial legislature but his power was much greater than this. He 
exercised royal prerogatives, and could attempt to coerce the legislature. He 
played an essential role in the passage of legislation, and had powers of 
prorogation and dissolution. But his power was even greater than that of the King 
in the balanced constitution, for he claimed to exercise powers over the 
government of the colony which no monarch claimed any longer to exercise in 
Britain itself .44 
  One historian has observed that “[T]he responsibility of the royal governor to the home 
government had placed him in much the same relation to the local assemblies as that in which 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
42.  See id. at 166. 
 
43. See VILE, supra note 20, at 139-40. See also supra note 20-23 and accompanying text (describing reasons for the 
growing popularity of the separation of powers doctrine). 
 
44. VILE, supra note 20, at 144-45. 
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the Stuart kings had been to the Commons.”45 James Wilson (Pa) recognized that the difficulty 
lay in the accountability of the governors to a foreign source. “{T}hey were regulated by foreign 
maxims: they were directed to a foreign purpose. Need we be surprised, that they were objects of 
aversion and distrust? Need we be surprised, that every occasion was seized for lessening their 
influence, and weakening their energy?”46 
 Initially, the colonists decried the extensive gubernatorial power as symptomatic of an 
imbalanced constitution. Over time, however, they articulated their discontent as a concern with 
a lack of a proper separation of powers.47 Thus, the idea of a mixed and balanced government 
gave way to a democratic version of separation of powers that eschewed monarchical and 
aristocratic power.48 Separation of powers was not a new idea; one historian has described it as a 
“relatively minor eighteenth century maxim.”49 Yet, it had received considerable attention in the 
political theories of such relatively modern thinkers as James Harrington, Marchamont Nedham, 
John Locke, Henry St. John Bolingbroke, Charles-Louis de Secondat Montesquieu, William 
Blackstone, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, and Emmanuel-Joseph Sieyes50 as well, to some degree in 
                                                 
45. CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENCY, 1775-1787: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL 
HISTORY 14 (Liberty Fund 2007) (1922). See Louis J. Sirico, Jr., The Trial of Charles I: A Sesquitricentennial 
Reflection. 16 CONST. COMMENT. 51, 52 (1999) (briefly describing the conflicts of Charles I with Parliament, ending 
when the Puritan-controlled army took over Parliament and had it order a trial of Charles for treason). 
 
46. See THACH, supra note 45, at 15 n.3 (quoting Wilson). 
.  
47. See VILE, supra note 20, at 140, 144-45. 
 
48. See id. at 132-33. 
 
49. WOOD, supra note 21, at 449. See supra, text accompanying n.23 for the full quotation. 
 
50. See GERHARD CASPAR, SEPARATING POWER: ESSAYS ON THE FOUNDING PERIOD 8 (1997). Caspar also notes the 
commonly recognized fact that these writers often conflated the notion of separation of powers with the arguably 
incompatible notion of mixed government. 
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the theories of such classical thinkers as Aristotle and Polybius.51 
 
B. The Post-Revolutionary State Constitutions 
 
 In light of the unfortunate history with colonial governors, it is unsurprising that when it 
came time for Americans to write their state constitutions, they generally would insist on 
powerful legislatures and extremely weak executives. As Thomas Jefferson observed: “Before 
the Revolution we were all good English Whigs, cordial in their free principles, and in their 
jealousies of their executive Magistrates.” These jealousies are very apparent in all our state 
constitutions.”52 
 This reallocation of political authority to the legislatures, however, did not mean a 
rejection of separation of powers, at least in theory. That doctrine explicitly made its way into the 
state constitutions of Virginia,53 Maryland,54 North Carolina,55 Massachusetts,56 New 
                                                 
51. See VILE, supra note 20, at 39-40; see also CASPAR, supra note 50, at 9-10 (noting the respect that John Adams 
had for Polybius). 
 
52. See THACH, supra note 45, at 14 n.2 (quoting Jefferson). 
 
53. See VA. CONST of 1776, para 2. 
 
54. See MD. CONST. of 1776,  A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § VI. 
 
55 See N.C. CONST. of 1776, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, § IV. 
 
56. See MA. CONST. of 1780, A DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XXX. After considerable delays brought on by a 
conflict over who should draft the state constitution, the state house of representatives and the councila body of 28, 
which sat as the upper house, the executive and the supreme judicial tribunalsat as a convention and proposed a 
constitution, which the voters rejected.  See VILE, supra note 20, at 164-65. Between 1779 and 1780, a constitutional 
convention, beset with delays, drafted a new constitution, which town meetings considered, article by individual 
article. When the majority of a town’s voters rejected an article, the town meeting often proposed an alternative. In 
1780, faced with a confusing set of responses from the towns, the convention declared that the constitution had 
received the approval of two-thirds of the voters. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 86-93. 
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Hampshire57, and Georgia.58 Perhaps Virginia’s constitution offered the most complete statement 
of the doctrine in its strictest form: 
The legislative, executive, and judiciary department, shall be separate and distinct, 
so that neither exercise the powers properly belonging to the other: nor shall any 
person exercise the powers of more than one of them, at the same time; except 
that the Justices of the County Courts shall be eligible to either House of 
Assembly.59 
 In accepting the doctrine, the former colonists claimed that they rejected the structure of 
most previous colonial governments. However, the new structures did not necessarily reflect that 
doctrine. For example, the colonists had seen the extensive power of the governors as resulting in 
an imbalanced constitution. In the new state constitutions, the governorships were far from 
separate independent branches of government. They had advisory councils elected by the 
legislatures or by popular vote. If the governor acted against the council’s advice, the council 
                                                 
57. See N.H. CONST. of 1784, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, para. XXXVII. In 1775 and 1776,, a convention drafted a 
provisional constitution, which was unpopular, at first, with those opposed to independence from Britain, and later 
with the small inland towns, who complained that they were underrepresented in state legislature. That constitution 
provided that the house of representatives would choose a council of twelve members “to be a distinct and separate 
branch of the Legislature . . . .” N.H. CONST. OF 1776, para. 3; see ADAMS, supra note 12, at 68-70, 266. In 1779, 
town meetings rejected another proposed constitution. See id. at 70.  
 
58. See GA. CONST. of 1777, art. I. No provisions addressed separation of powers in the New Jersey 
Constitution of 1776, the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, or the South Carolina Constitution of 1776. Three 
constitutions declared a separation of the branches of the state legislature. See DEL. CONST. of 1776, art. 2 (“two 
distinct  branches); N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. II (“two separate and distinct bodies of men”);  S.C. CONST. of 1778, 
art. II (“two distinct bodies”). Connecticut and Rhode Island relied on their colonial charters and adopted no true 
constitutions until 1818 and 1842, respectively. See CT. CONST .of 1776, para. 1 (declaring that the royal charter of 
1662 would continue as the civil constitution of the state). Rhode Island adopted no similar document declaring that 
it was continuing to follow its royal charter of 1663. 
 
59. VA. CONST. of 1776,  para. 2. 
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was expected to file a formal dissent.60 Moreover, in most states, the legislature appointed the 
governor’s subordinate officials.61 
 In practice, then, the post-revolutionary state governments typically offered only a nod to 
the doctrine of separation of powers. With respect to the first post-Revolution constitutions, one 
historian has concluded: “With one exception, that of New York, they included almost every 
conceivable provision for reducing the executive power to a position of complete 
subordination.”62 When the executive acted, the legislature would regularly decide that the 
executive had intruded onto turf that belonged to the legislative branch.63 
 According to some historians, the primary result of the separation of powers doctrine was 
to bar the same individual from serving in both the executive and legislative branches but 
allowing many intrusions by the legislative branch on the other branches.64 On the other hand, 
the doctrine also separated the executive from the lawmaking function of the legislative branch.65 
 During the next few years, however, the executive branch gained comparatively more 
independence in the later constitutions of New York, Massachusetts, and New Hampshire.66 The 
words of these constitutions suggest a sophisticated understanding of the practical limits on 
                                                 
60. See RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 252; THACH, supra note 45, at 16.  
61. See id. 
62. THACH, supra note 45, at 15-16. 
63. See id. at 17-22. 
64. See EDWARD S. CORWIN, The Progress of Constitutional Theory Between the Declaration of 
Independence and the Meeting of the Philadelphia Convention in AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 1, 4-5 
(Alpheus T. Mason & Gerald Garvey ed. 1964 ( giving the New Hampshire experience as an example); VILE, supra 
note 20, at 147-49 (generally agreeing, but noting that the actual degree of separation varied from state to state). 
 
65. See VILE, supra note 20, at 148. 
66. See THACH, supra note 45, at 23-39 (offering a detailed accounting of the drafting of these documents).  
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implementing a separation of powers doctrine. 
 The New Hampshire Constitution recognized that a strict separation of powers might not 
be possible or in the best interests of a free government: 
In the government of this state, the three essential powers thereof, to wit, the 
legislative, executive, and judicial, ought to be kept as separate from and 
independent of each other, as the nature of a free government will admit, or as is 
consistent with that chain of connection that binds the whole fabric of the 
constitution in one indissoluble bond of union and amity.67 
  The New York Constitution awarded the governor considerable power. The citizenry 
elected the governor. The governor could veto legislation, but only as part of a revisionary 
council that also included the state supreme court judges and the chancellor. A two-thirds 
majority of both houses was required to overrule the veto. Although the lower house of the 
legislature could initiate impeachment proceedings, conviction could come only from a special 
council consisting of senators, the chancellor, and state supreme court judges.68 The New York 
Constitution also gave the governor a role in making political appointments by including him in 
a Council for Appointments whose other members were four senators.69 Thus this constitution 
suggested an acceptance of checks and balances, that is, sacrificing strict separation in favor of 
permitting the branches to share some powers so that one branch could check the conduct of the 
                                                 
67. N.H. CONST. of 1784, THE BILL OF RIGHTS, para. XXXVII 
68. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 268 (summarizing N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III, XVII & XXXII ). 
69. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 274 (summarizing N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXIII & amend. V). 
The New York Constitution initially provided that the governor would have “a casting voice, but no other vote . . . .” 
The amendment clarified this ambiguous wording to provide that the vote was “vested concurrently” in the governor 
and council members.  
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other branches.70 
 The Massachusetts Constitution also gave the governor considerable power. A popular 
vote served as the method for selecting the governor.71 Although the state constitution also 
established an executive council, the governor was authorized to call together its members at his 
discretion and employ it in an advisory capacity.72  The governor also enjoyed the check of a 
legislative veto power, subject to an override by two-thirds of both houses of the legislature.73 
New Hampshire’s 1784 constitution followed the Massachusetts scheme, although it did not 
grant its executive a legislative veto.74 
 Although the state constitutions suggest some common themes, particularly in their 
delegation of most authority to the legislature and their reliance on the separation of powers 
doctrine, they also suggest a lack of consensus on other issues. The drafters of the constitutions 
disagreed on how much power to grant the executive75 and on whether government works best 
with a strict separation of powers or with some sharing of powers in order to provide for checks 
and balances on the governmental branches.76 A concern about structuring government to avoid 
                                                 
70. See VILE, supra note 20, at 147 (recognizing New York’s contribution to American constitutional 
theory). 
71. See MA. CONST. of 1780, Part II, ch. II, § I, art, III. 
72. See id. at Part II, ch. II, § I, art. IV-VI. 
73. See id. at Part II, ch. I, § I, art. II. The prominence of checks and balances in the Massachusetts 
constitution was encouraged by the “Essex Result” in which Essex County called for greater executive authority and 
the use of checks and balances. See VILE, supra note 20, at 164-67; THACH, supra note 45, at 33-36 (discussing the 
Essex Result). 
74. See THACH, supra note 45, at 39. 
75. See VILE, supra note 20, at 169 (identifying this issue). 
76. See id.at 168-69 (identifying this issue). 
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or minimize corrupt conduct also underlay this dialogue.77 
 Because of this diverse background, the deputies to the Constitutional Convention were 
of differing minds on these issues. In addition, although the deputies had previous experience on 
the state level, they now were dealing with these issues on the national level where their 
deliberations had to consider the demands of this new political context. These issues were 
intertwined; in sorting them out, views of the deputies on separation of powers had decisive 
influence on the process of defining the Executive. 
 
III. THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION AND THE EXECUTIVE 
 
 The deputies to the Convention focused on the separation of powers doctrine with respect 
to seven issues concerning the executive branch: choosing the Executive, permitting the 
Executive to stand for a second term, devising the executive veto, requiring legislative advice 
and consent on executive appointments, authorizing the Executive to grant reprieves and 
pardons, and making the Vice President the President of the Senate. On these issues, the debate 
made clear how interconnected were the questions of how much power the Executive should 
enjoy, how strictly the separation of powers doctrine should apply, and how effective a variety of 
checks and balances might prove.78 
 
                                                 
77. See supra text accompanying notes 39 & 40. 
78. The index to a leading edition of Madison’s Notes highlights how much the debate over separation of 
powers focused on the executive branch. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 673. In that edition, under the 
heading “separation of powers,” the index lists ten references to the executive branch (see id. at 49, 56, 80, 311-12, 
313 n*, 326, 338, 340, 588 & 596), three references to summaries of proceedings thus far or to drafts of the final 
document (see id. at 115, 379 & 385)and two to general allusions to the doctrine (see id. at 34-35 & 124). 
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A. Choosing the Executive 
 
 Determining the method for selecting the Executive proved to be one of the Convention’s 
most difficult tasks. It did not fully resolve the issue until the very end of the three and one-half 
month session.79 Proposed methods included election by the national legislature, popular vote, 
state legislatures, state executives, and popularly chosen electors.80 One concern was how to 
insure that the Executive would not become dependent on whoever selected him. Yet, Roger 
Sherman (Ct.), at this point fearful of a strong executive, declared that he favored election by the 
national legislature, making the executive “absolutely dependent” on the national legislature “as 
it was the will of that which was to be executed.”81 In his opinion, an “independence of the 
Executive on the supreme Legislature was . . . the very essence of tyranny if there was any such 
thing.”82 
 The prevailing sentiment, however, favored separating the executive and legislative 
branches. Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) elaborated on dangers of corruption and the threat of 
legislative tyranny. 
If the Legislature have the Executive dependent on them, they can perpetuate & 
support their usurpations by the influence of tax-gatherers & other officers, by 
fleets armies, etc. Cabal & corruption are attached to that mode of election . . . . 
                                                                                                                                                             
 
79. See supra note 32 (providing a chronology of the major votes on the issue). 
80. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 370 ( George Mason (Va.) summarizing the proposed choices 
and finding them all unsatisfactory). 
 
81. Id.at 48.  
82. Id. 
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Hence the Executive is interested in Courting popularity in the Legislature by 
sacrificing his Executive Rights; and then he can go into that Body, after the 
expiration of his Executive office, and enjoy there the fruits of his policy. To 
these considerations he added that rivals would be continually intriguing to oust 
the President from his place.83 
 The question, then, was what alternative method should the deputies choose. James 
Wilson (Pa.) advocated appointment by popular vote in an effort to make the legislative and 
executive departments “ as independent as possible of each other, as well as of the states.”84  He 
was the first to suggest selecting the executive with an electoral system in which citizens would 
choose electors who would make the choice.85  
 James Madison also agreed it was essential that “the appointment of the Executive should 
either be draw from some source, or held by some tenure, that will give him a free agency with 
regard to the Legislature.”86 Like Wilson, he preferred popular election87 and reiterated the 
separation of powers concern, noting that a coalition of the executive and legislative powers 
“would be more immediately & certainly dangerous to public liberty [than would be a coalition 
of the legislative and judicial branches].”88 
                                                 
83. Id. at 525. Morris had previously made the same point and had urged popular election of the Executive, 
evidencing an sanguine trust in the people: “If the people should elect, they will never fail to prefer some man of 
distinguished character, or services; some man . . . of continental reputation.” Id. at 306. 
 
84. Id. at 49. 
85. See id. at 50. 
86. Id. at 327. 
87. See id.  at 365; see id. at 363-66 (Madison reiterating this point). 
88. Id. at 326-27. 
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 Oliver Ellsworth (Ct.) offered a different solution: Authorize the national legislature to 
choose an Executive, but if the Executive chooses to seek a second term, authorize the state 
legislatures to appoint electors to decide the election.89 
 Elbridge Gerry (Ma.) also opposed authorizing the legislature to appoint the executive 
and emphasized the threat of corruption that it entailed: “[I]t would lessen that independence of 
the Executive which ought to prevail, would give birth to intrigue and corruption between the 
Executive and Legislature previous to the election, and to partiality in the Executive afterwards 
to the friends who promoted him.”90 However, always fearful of the democratic impulse, he 
rejected popular election and instead, proposed an electoral system in which the state executives 
would choose electors.91 
 The Convention eventually reached a consensus on employing an electoral system;92 
however, it still faced the problem of deciding how to select the Executive if more than one 
candidate received an equal number majority of votes or if no candidate received a majority of 
electoral votes. A committee proposed authorizing the Senate to choose one of the majority 
candidates as President, and if no candidate received a majority of electoral votes, authorizing 
the Senate to choose the President from among the five highest vote getters.93 
                                                 
89. See id. at 363. 
90. Id. at 93. 
91. See id. at 93 & 327. Gerry later modified his proposal. He suggested permitting the state executives to 
appoint the Executive “with the advice of their Councils and where there are no Councils by Electors chosen by the 
Legislatures.” Id. at  363. 
 
92. A committee with representatives from all states in attendance proposed the shift to electors. See id. at 
574. Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) justified the shift on several grounds, including “the indispensible necessity of making 
the Executive independent of the Legislature” and the impossibility of corrupting the electors. Id. at 577. At this 
point, the controversy on the issue came to a halt. 
 
93. See id. at 574. 
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  The proposal failed to garner unanimous approval. Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) 
disapproved of the “mutual connection and influence” that the proposal would create between 
the two branches.94 Charles Pinckney (S.C.) feared the mode of election would make the 
Executive “the mere creature” of the Senate.95 James Wilson argued that the proposal had a 
“dangerous tendency toward aristocracy” in that it gave too much power to the Senate:96 “They 
will have in fact, the appointment of the President, and through his dependence on them, the 
virtual appointment to offices; among others the offices of the Judiciary Department. They are to 
make Treaties; and they are to try all impeachments.”97 
  In response to these concerns and with little debate, the  Convention later shifted the 
responsibility to the House, the less aristocratic body and the body having fewer entanglements 
with the Executive.98 
 These deliberations illustrate how strongly the separation of powers doctrine influenced 
the method of selecting the Executive and led to a method closely related to popular election. To 
avoid executive dependency on the legislative branch, the deputies explored a variety of 
alternative methods and ultimately settled on an electoral system. The chosen system permitted 
considerable reliance on the democratic voice. In addition, by reducing the disproportionate 
voting power that the heavily populated states enjoyed, the use of electors prevented those states 
from completely controlling the outcome. 
                                                 
94. See id. at 589. 
95. See id. at 582. 
96. See id. at 587. 
97. Id.  
98 See id. at 592 (providing the vote). 
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 Without the concern over separation of powers, it is doubtful that the deputies would 
have turned to a system that would so reflect popular sentiment. Instead, they likely would have 
delegated the power of appointment to the Senate or House. 
 When the deputies faced the problem of breaking ties and resolving close election 
contests, situations some expected to occur regularly,99 they were willing to violate the strict 
version of the separations of powers doctrine by assigning that responsibility first to the Senate 
and later to the House. Shifting the forum to the House also reflected in part a concern over 
separation of powers. In addition to being the more democratic legislative branch, the House was 
also comparatively less entwined with the Executive. 
 
B. Permitting the Executive to Seek a Second Term 
 
 Closely connected with the issue of appointing the Executive was the issue whether an 
Executive could seek reelection. If the Executive were chosen by the national legislature, and 
eligible for a second term as well, the Executive wishing a second term might decide to assume a 
submissive role with respect to the Legislature and become dependent upon it. Moreover, if he 
courted reappointment, as Edmund Randolph (Va.) noted, he might exercise his powers in a way 
“subservient to the views of the Large States,” which would control the Legislature.100  
 On the other hand, as Gouverneur Morris (N.Y.) stated, ineligibility for an additional 
                                                 
99. See. e.g., id. at 577 (George Mason (Va.) arguing that if the Senate were to decide the inconclusive 
elections, “nineteen times out of twenty the President would be chosen by the Senate, an improper body for the 
purpose.”); see id. at 582 & 589 (Charles Pinckney (S.C.) and Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.), respectively, making the 
same point.) 
 
100. Id. at   325. 
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term “tended to destroy the great motive to good behavior, the hope of being rewarded by a re-
appointment.”101 To make the legislature independent of the Legislature, Morris favored popular 
election.102 Oliver Ellsworth (Ct.) agreed with Morris: “And he will be more likely to render 
himself, worthy of [reelection] if he be rewarded with it.”103 
 The deputies also considered how the threat of impeachment should affect their decision. 
Rufus King (Ma.) favored reeligibility, because he believed that the benefit of reelecting a good 
Executive outweighed the danger of dependency on the Legislature, especially because the threat 
of impeachment would deter misconduct.104 Other deputies proposed banning reelection, but 
establishing a longer term of office, perhaps relying on impeachment as a sufficient check on the 
Executive.105 
 During the debate, one deputy proposed rotation of office as an alternative to reelection. 
Charles Pinckney (S.C.) unsuccessfully proposed that no one elected Executive by the 
Legislature could serve for more than six years out of every twelve years. In his view, this 
method would eliminate the need to ban reelection.106 
 When a committee of deputies proposed employing an electoral system to select the 
                                                 
101. Id. at 310; see id. at  323-26 (Morris making the same point). 
102. See id. at 325. 
103. Id.  at   358. 
104. See id. at 358. 
105. See id. at 358 (Luther Martin (Md.) proposing an 11 year term, Elbridge Gerry (Ma.) Proposing a 15 
year term, William Davie proposing an 8 year term). In contrast, in most state constitutions, where the legislature 
enjoyed considerable power, the typical term for an executive was one year. See VILE, supra note 20, at 156. 
 
106. See id. at 366. 
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Executive,107 it argued that the change obviated the need to prohibit reelection.108 Once the 
Convention adopted the proposal, objections to reelection quickly died out. The concern over 
reelection, then, was tied to the separation of powers concern that permitting the legislative 
branch to select the Executive would compromise the independence of the individual that it 
appointed. 
 
C. Removing the Executive 
 
 The Convention debated how to deal with an Executive who was performing his duties in 
a highly inappropriate manner. Some deputies rejected the notion of removing an Executive and 
advocated relying on his leaving office at the end of his term.109 Perhaps they were accustomed 
to the practice under the state constitutions, which made no provisions for the recall of a 
legislator or governor during a term of office.110 This position assumed a relatively short term of 
office and the right to seek reelection. Most, however, supported establishing a method for 
impeachment. The issue dividing the deputies was which body would make the decision to 
                                                 
107. See id. at 574. The proposal included no ban on reelection and thus implicitly permitted reelection. 
Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) spoke to the Convention on behalf of the committee and made the committee’s position 
clear. See infra note 108 and accompanying text. 
 
108. See id. at 576 (Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) indirectly making this point). But see id. at 577 (Hugh 
Williamson (N.C.) objecting that reelection “will endanger the public liberty), id. at 582 (Charles Pinckney (S.C.) &  
John Rutledge (S.C.) objecting to reeligibility even under an electoral system). 
 
109. See id. at 331 (Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) & Charles Pickney (S.C.)), 333 (Rufus King (Ma.)). Morris 
later reversed his position. See id. at 335. 
 
110. See ADAMS, supra note 12, at 244 (stating this fact). The South Carolina Constitution of 1776 did 
authorize an absolute executive veto. See S.C. CONST. of 1776, art. VII. The state’s 1778 constitution, however, did 
not.  Most state governors served for a single term and presumably would not be able to continue corrupt conduct in 
office for very long. See ADAMS, supra note 12,. at 245 (providing term lengths for governors, senators, 
representatives, and councillors for each state). 
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impeach. The most appropriate candidate seemed to be the national legislature. Yet, this solution 
raised the problem of separation of powers. 
 At an early stage in the Convention when the deputies assumed that the Legislature 
would select the Executive, John Dickinson (De.) unsuccessfully proposed removal of the 
Executive by the National Legislature at the request of the majority of the state legislatures.111 
Presumably under the proposal, tiny Delaware would have an equal vote with heavily populated 
Virginia. However, Dickinson based his proposal on his concern with maintaining a separation 
of powers. He argued  that “the Legislative, Executive, and Judiciary departments ought to be 
made as independent as possible,” but that a very independent Executive “was not consistent 
with a republic; that a firm Executive could only exist in a limited monarchy.”112  In the absence 
of a limited monarchy, Dickinson staked the stability of the Executive on the support it could 
enjoy from the dual branches of the national legislature and the separate states.113 Therefore, he 
proposed involving the states in any effort to remove the Executive. 
 George Mason (Va.) agreed that some procedure for removal was necessary. However, 
he “opposed decidedly the making of the Executive the mere creature of the Legislature as a 
violation of the fundamental principle of good Government.”114 
 Following the failure of Dickinson’s motion, Hugh Williamson (N.C.) and William 
Davies (N.C.), successfully moved that the Executive “be removeable on impeachment and 
                                                 
111. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 55. Only Delaware voted for Dickinson’s proposal. See id. at 
57. 
112. Id. at 56. 
113, See id. at 56-57. 
114. Id. at 56. 
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conviction of mal-practice or neglect of duty.”115 These grounds are far broader than the grounds 
in the final document: “Treason, Bribery or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.”116 The broad 
grounds made the Executive quite vulnerable to impeachment. By granting the Legislature such 
power, the deputies indicated that they did not view the Executive as a strong, independent 
branch of government and were willing to risk excessive executive dependence on the 
Legislature. 
 The issue, however, was far from settled. In a later debate, Charles Pinckney (S.C.) 
argued that if the Legislature held the power of impeachment, it would hold impeachment “as a 
rod over the Executive and by that means effectively destroy his independence.”117 Pinckney 
seemed to assume that the Executive would not be strong branch of government: “He presumed 
that [the Executive’s] powers would be so circumscribed as to render impeachments 
unnecessary.”118   
 Rufus King (Ma.) largely agreed that impeachment was inadvisable and took the strict 
separationist position. He urged “the primitive axiom that the three great departments of 
Government should be separate and independent . . . .”119 He would not permit impeachment 
unless the Executive should serve “during good behavior” and even then would not grant the 
authority to impeach to the Legislature, because such an arrangement “would be destructive of 
                                                 
115. Id. at 58. 
116. U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 4. 
117. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 333. 
118. Id. at 335. 
119. Id. at 333. 
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[the Executive’s] independence and of the principles of the Constitution.”120 
 By July 20, the Convention had decided overwhelmingly that the Executive should be 
subject to impeachment.121 Yet, on the closing days of the convention, John Rutledge (S.C.) and 
Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) moved “that persons impeached be suspended from their office until 
they be tried and acquitted.”122 James Madison successfully opposed the motion arguing that the 
Executive “is made too dependent already on the Legislature, by the power of one branch to try 
him in consequence of an impeachment by the other. This intermediate suspension, will put him 
in the power of one branch only.”123 
 With respect to authorizing impeachment, the major contrary argument was that a 
removal process would violate the separation of powers doctrine and thus make the Executive 
too dependent on the Legislature. Yet, even during a time when selection of the Executive lay 
within the province of the Legislature, the deputies were willing to set aside the objection in 
order to establish a mechanism for removing an Executive who engaged in misconduct. The 
deputies thus showed that they were willing to modify a strict separation of powers by adding a 
check by one branch on another. Moreover, by making the procedure for removal cumbersome, 
they gave the Executive–and the Judiciary– more independence than they otherwise might have 
enjoyed.124 
 
                                                 
120. Id. at 334. 
121. Id. at 335. 
122. Id. at 635. 
123. Id.  
124. See BRUFF, supra note 1, at 311 (making this point). 
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D. Devising the Executive Veto 
 
 The Virginia Plan, the set of proposals that the Convention first considered, provided that 
a Council of Revision should have veto power over the national legislature with the Council 
consisting of “the Executive and a convenient number of the National Judiciary.”125 The proposal 
perhaps offered a compromise with the precedent of the state constitutions that did not authorize 
an executive veto.126 However, the proposal failed  and gave way to a veto exercised by the 
Executive alone, but with the option of a legislative override.127  
 With the defeat of the proposal for a revisionary council, James Wilson (Pa.) and James 
Madison immediately moved for an alternative in which the Executive and some members of the 
federal judiciary would exercise a joint legislative veto.128 On three occasions, Wilson and 
Madison unsuccessfully moved for a veto exercised by both these branches.129 
 As might be expected, the proposal met with the objection that it would defeat the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Elbridge Gerry (Ma.) argued that the proposal would bind 
together the Executive and Judiciary “in an offensive and defensive alliance against the 
Legislature, and render the latter unwilling to enter into a contest with them.”130 Nathaniel 
                                                 
125. Id. at 32. 
126. See LUTZ, supra note 10, at 105-06. See also ADAMS, supra note 12, at 273 (describing the failure of 
John Adams to include an executive veto in the Massachusetts constitution). New York’s constitution provided for 
an executive veto three-fifths legislative override. The executive veto would be exercised by the governor, the 
chancellor, and the judges of the state’s supreme court, or any two of them. See N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. III.  
127. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 66. 
128. See id. at 66. 
129. See id. at 66, 79-81, 336-43 & 461-62. 
130. Id. at 342 
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Ghorum (Ma.) feared that giving the Judiciary a share of the revisionary power would affect how 
judges would later carry out the exposition of the law in deciding cases.131 He further noted that 
under the proposal “the Judges would outnumber the Executive [and] the revisionary check 
would be thrown entirely out of the Executive hands, and instead of enabling him to defend 
himself, would enable the Judges to sacrifice him.”132 
 In support of the proposal, Madison argued that combining with Executive with the 
Judiciary would encourage the Executive to stand firm in pursuing the public interest and in  
avoiding corrupting temptations.133 He further argued that the arrangement would “enable the 
Judiciary Department to better defend itself against Legislative encroachments.”134 But perhaps 
the primary concern was that the Legislature would overwhelm the other branches. He brought 
home his point with a striking metaphor:  
Experience in all the States had evinced a powerful tendency in the Legislature to 
absorb all power into its vortex. This was the real source of danger to the 
American Constitutions; and suggested the necessity of giving every defensive 
authority to the other departments that was consistent with republican 
principles.135 
 Madison saw no violation of the separation of power doctrine. Rather, he thought of the 
                                                 
131. See id. 
132. Id. at 343. 
133. See id. at 79 & 337. 
134. Id. 
135. Id. at 338. Madison had previously used the same metaphor. See id. at 312 & supra note 17 and 
accompanying text.. He repeated it during the ratification debates. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 17, at 
333. 
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proposal as “an auxiliary precaution in favor of the maxim;” it added a “defensive power” to 
each branch that would secure the branch’s independence.136 Madison pointed to the British 
constitutional practices of admitting judges to the House of Lords and executive councils where 
they could review certain laws and of permitting the King to veto legislation.137 He  further noted 
that if joining the Executive and Judicial into a revisionary body was an improper mixture of 
powers, then so was granting a veto to the Executive alone.138 
 Wilson also denied any violation of the separation of powers doctrine. “The separation of 
the departments does not require that they should have separate objects but that they should act 
separately though on the same objects.”139 
 After the final defeat of the proposal by Madison and Wilson, the Convention expressed 
its concern over the lack of a sufficient check on the Legislature by voting to change the 
legislative override of a veto so that an override would require a three-fourths vote by each 
House, as opposed to a two-thirds vote.140 In the final days of the Convention, however, it 
reversed itself and reverted to requiring only a two-thirds vote out a fear that a three-fourths 
override put too much power in the hands of the Executive.141 
                                                 
136. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 340. 
137. See id. at 341. Madison neglected to point out that the British monarch had not exercised the veto 
power against Parliament since 1708. See EDWARD GREGG, QUEEN ANNE 144 (2001) (Queen Anne’s veto of the 
Scottish Militia Bill). However, the royal governors regularly exercised their veto power over colonial laws. The 
British monarch  override these vetoes. See EDMUND S. MORGAN, INVENTING THE PEOPLE: THE RISE OF POPULAR 
SOVEREIGNTY IN ENGLAND AND AMERICA 140 (1989). 
 
138 See id. 
139. Id. at 342. 
140. See id. at 462-65. 
141. See id. at 627-29. In opposition to the reversal, Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) and Alexander Hamilton 
(N.Y.) argued that in New York, a two-thirds override vote had proven ineffective in curbing legislative abuses. See 
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 The proposal by Madison and Wilson and the ensuing debate demonstrates how checks 
and balances can clash with the separation of powers doctrine. Although the deputies were ready 
to award the Executive a qualified veto over the Legislature, they were unwilling to go so far as 
to permit the Executive and Judiciary to combine against the Legislature. The argument that the 
Legislature possessed too great a potential for abuse, as documented by the conduct of the state 
legislatures, proved insufficiently strong to justify so strong a check on it. Still, it seems 
remarkable that Madison and Wilson should have felt so strongly about the abuse of legislative 
power that they repeatedly raised an arguably extreme proposal that offered no chance of 
approval.142 
 Madison later argued that the veto protected the Executive from encroachments by the 
Legislature.143 He further argued that because the veto involved both branches in law making, it 
helped insure that only good legislation would gain approval.144 
 Underlying the deliberations must also have been a lingering fear of the Executive. The 
                                                                                                                                                             
id. at 628. Madison pointed out that [w]hen 3/4 was agreed to, the President was to be elected by the Legislature and 
for seven years. He is now to be elected by the people and for four years.” Id. at 629. It is unclear how this 
observation confirmed Madison’s vote in favor of a three-quarters vote. Popular election would increase the 
independence of the Executive, while a short term would seem to make him less independent.  
 
142. The votes on the proposal were 3-8 (See id. at 81); 3-4, with Pennsylvania and Georgia divided and 
New Jersey not present (See id. at 343); and 3-8 (See id. at 462). New York’s constitution, however, contained a 
very similar arrangement. See supra note 124. 
 
143.  “Without [the veto] the [Executive] would be absolutely unable to defend himself against the 
depredations of the latter. He might gradually be stripped of his authorities by successive resolutions, or annihilated 
by a single vote.” THE FEDERALIST NO. 73, supra note 17, at 494-95. 
 
 144.   The power in question has a further use. It not only serves as a shield to the 
executive, but it furnishes an additional security against the enaction of improper 
laws. It establishes a salutary check upon the legislative body calculated to 
guard the community against the effects of faction, precipitancy, or of any 
impulse unfriendly to the public good, which may happen to influence a 
majority of that body. 
Id. at 495. 
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debate over whether the legislative override should require a two-thirds or three-fourths vote 
demonstrates the concern over granting the Executive too much power. 
 
E. Requiring Legislative Advice and Consent on Executive Appointments 
 
 In developing a provision governing executive appointments, the deputies followed an 
increasingly complex course and arrived at a sophisticated resolution. The Virginia Plan, the first 
proposal that the Convention considered, made no mention of who should appoint the various 
national officers. Early in the deliberations, however, James Madison successfully moved that 
the Executive should have the power “to appoint to offices in cases not otherwise provided for . . 
. .”
145
 He thus departed from the rule in most states granting the power of appointment to the 
legislature.146 
 Later, Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) suggested, but did not make a motion for a more 
specific statement of this authority: “to have the sole appointment of the heads or chief officers 
of the departments of Finance, War and Foreign Affairs; to have the nominations of all other 
officers (Ambassadors to foreign Nations included) subject to the approbation or rejection of the 
Senate . . . .”147 This proposal followed a speech in which Hamilton advocated a strong 
Executive with lifetime tenure.148 Thus it is noteworthy that even Hamilton would place a 
senatorial check on a great number of important executive appointments.  
                                                 
145. MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 47. 
146. See CASPAR, supra note 50, at 13. 
147 MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 138. 
148. See id. at 136-37. 
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 Yet, even by early August, the Convention’s Committee of Detail could draft a broad 
grant of power to the Executive and face no opposition: “[H]e shall commission all officers of 
the United States; and shall appoint officers in all cases not otherwise provided for in this 
Constitution.”149 However, the Committee’s proposal delegated to the Senate the power to 
appoint ambassadors and judges of the Supreme Court,150 and to the Legislature, the election of 
the Treasurer.151 The Committee thus adhered to a strict separation of powers. Rather than these 
two branches of government collaborating or checking one another, each would make different 
appointments independent of the other. Moreover, it allocated some of the most significant 
appointments to the Senate. 
 Both Gouverneur Morris (Pa.) And James Wilson (Pa.) objected to the proposal. Morris 
stated that he considered the Senate “as too numerous for the purpose; as subject to cabal and as 
devoid of responsibility.” Moreover, if the Senate were to have the power to try judges for 
impeachment, “it was particularly wrong to let the Senate have the filling of vacancies which its 
own decrees were to create.”152 
 Near the end of the Convention, a committee proposed increasing the number of 
appointments that the Executive could make, but also proposed a limitation on the Executive’s 
discretionary authority: 
                                                 
149. Id. at 392. Under the proposal of the Committee of Detail the House would have the power to choose 
its Speaker and other officers. See id. at 386. The Senate would have the power to choose its President and other 
officers. See id. at 387. The deputies later agreed to reword the authorization to the Executive for the sake of clarity. 
The new wording stated that the Executive “shall appoint to all offices established by this Constitution, except in 
cases herein otherwise provided for, and to all offices which may hereafter be created by law.” Id. at 527. 
 
150.  See id. at 391. 
151. See id. 
152 Id. at 517 ( including both quotations). 
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The President by and with the advice and Consent of the Senate, shall have the 
power to make Treaties; and he shall nominate and by and with the advice and 
consent of the Senate shall appoint ambassadors, and other public Ministers, 
Judges of the Supreme Court, and all other Officers of the U.S., whose 
appointments are not otherwise herein provided for.153 
 James Wilson of Pennsylvania unsuccessfully objected that this mode of appointing “as 
blending a branch of the Legislature with the Executive.”154 He argued that a good executive 
must have “a responsible appointment of officers to execute,” and that “[r]esponsibility is in a 
manner destroyed by such an agency.”155 Aside from some support from Charles Pinckney of 
South Carolina,156 and George Mason’s proposal for a privy council for the Executive,157 Wilson 
stood alone. 
 Later, Gouverneur Morris successfully moved to authorize Congress to “vest the 
appointment of such inferior offices as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of 
law, or in the heads of Departments.”158 
                                                 
153. Id. at 575. 
154. Id. at 598. 
155. Id. 
156. See id. 
157. See id. at 596-97. 
158. Id. at 647. The Constitution thus states that the Executive: 
shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall 
appoint Ambassadors, other public ministers and Consuls, Judges of the 
supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments 
are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: 
but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as 
they think proper, in the President alone, to the Courts of Law, or in the Heads 
of Departments. 
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 cl. 2. 
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 In the end, the deputies had moved from giving the Executive unfettered discretion, to 
dividing authority over appointments between the Executive and Senate, to increasing the 
Executive appointment power, but with a Senatorial check on the major appointments. From a 
separation of powers perspective, the deputies moved from a strict separation of powers to a 
system of checks and balances. In return for greater breadth of authority, to the dismay of some 
deputies, the Executive lost a degree of autonomy. Nonetheless, the Executive had gained 
considerable power. As one authority on separation of powers has argued, authorizing the 
Executive to make appointments to the judiciary and to positions central to foreign policy, “was 
a critical step toward a unified executive that could implement its own vision of foreign policy, 
and that could leave an enduring mark on the federal judiciary.”159  
 
F. Authorizing the Executive to Grant Reprieves and Pardons 
 
 With relatively little debate, the deputies authorized the Executive to grant pardons. 
Alexander Hamilton (N.Y.) first suggested establishing the power in the Executive, although he 
would have not permitted a pardon for treason.160 Later in the Convention, the Committee of 
Detail proposed that [The Executive] shall have the power to grant reprieves and pardons; but his 
pardon shall not be pleadable in bar of an impeachment.”161 Only Roger Sherman attempted to  a 
check the Executive’s discretion by making an overwhelmingly unsuccessful motion authorizing 
                                                 
159. BRUFF, supra note 1, at 390. 
160. See MADISON’S NOTES, supra note 1, at 138. 
161. Id. at 392. The Convention later adopted a more felicitous rephrasing: “[H]e shall have power to grant 
reprieves and pardons for offences against the United States, except in cases of impeachment.” Id. at 623.  
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the Executive “to grant reprieves and pardons until the ensuing session of the Senate, and 
pardons with consent of the Senate.”162 
 The issue of separation of powers arose briefly when Edmund Randolph (Va.) 
unsuccessfully moved to exempt treason from the crimes that the Executive could pardon. The 
fear of corruption motivated him: ”The prerogative of power in these cases was too great a trust. 
The President himself may be guilty. The Traytors may be his own instruments.”163  
 Rufus King (Ma.), however, directly addressed the separation of powers concern. He 
declared that assigning the pardoning power for treason to the Legislature “would be inconsistent 
with the Constitutional separation of the Executive and Legislative powers . . . .”164 King 
regarded the Legislature as overly governed by passions of the moment and therefore unfit for 
the task. Instead, he suggested permitting the Executive to grant pardon in these cases, but to 
require the concurrence of the Senate.165 Madison offered an alternative. He agreed that the 
pardon of treasons was “so peculiarly improper for the President” and preferred “an association 
of the Senate as a Council of advice, with the President.”166 Randolph, however, objected to 
combining the Executive and the Senate in this task as “ a great danger to liberty.”167 On this 
issue, then, the separation of powers arguments failed, perhaps because the deputies did not see a 
great danger to liberty arising from investing the pardoning power in one branch of government. 
                                                 
162. Id. at 534. Only Connecticut voted in favor of Sherman’s motion. 
163. Id. at 646. 
164 Id. at 646. 
165. See id. 
166. Id. 
167. Id. 
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G. Making the Vice President the President of the Senate 
 
 The notion of creating the office of Vice President arose late in the Convention.168 The 
only responsibility given the office holder was to preside over the Senate. Roger Sherman (Ct.) 
explained the necessity of giving him this responsibility: “If the vice-President were not to be 
President of the Senate, he would be without employment, and some member by being made 
President must be deprived of his vote, unless when an equal division of votes might happen in 
the Senate, which would be but seldom.”169    
  Although the deputies approved of this proposal, they first engaged in a brief debate 
concerning the issue of separation of powers. Elbridge Gerry (Ma.) objected that the close 
intimacy of the President and Vice-President made the proposal improper.170 George Mason 
(Va.) argued that “such an officer as vice-President [was] an encroachment on the rights of the 
Senate; and that it mixed too much the Legislative and Executive, which as well as the Judiciary 
departments, ought to be kept as separate as possible.”171 The vote favoring the proposal, 
however, was decisive.172 Practical considerations seemed to override any concern over 
separation of powers. 
                                                 
168. On September 4, a committee proposed the office to the Convention. See id. at  575. 
169. Id. at 596. 
170 See id. 
171. Id. 
172. See id. at 597 (the Convention voting 8-2 with one state absent). 




 The separation of powers doctrine played a significant role in shaping the Executive. 
Concern over violating the doctrine led to an electoral system that bottomed the branch on the 
people and threw close elections to the House, the more democratic legislative body. These 
results, in turn, opened the door to the possibility of reelection.  
 Concern over separation of powers, however, proved insufficiently compelling to deprive 
Congress of the power to remove an Executive for serious misconduct. On this matter, the need 
to check one branch with another prevailed. 
 The notion of checks and balances also played a significant role in constructing the 
executive veto. Without the legislative override, the executive veto doubtless would have proven 
unacceptable. As for executive appointments, concern over excessive executive power led to 
granting the Senate a concurring role and thus weakened the Executive. Concern over separation 
of powers, however, failed to prove strong enough to curb the Executive’s power to pardon and 
to create a vice presidency. 
 During the course of the Convention, the resolution of these issues helped the notion of 
the Executive grow stronger. Perhaps the most significant contributions to this growth were the 
decisions to embrace a modified popular election and to permit an executive veto. Given the 
background of the post revolutionary state constitutions with their weak executives and powerful 
legislatures, these decisions could not have come easily. 
 Although these decisions had theoretical foundations, the deputies still acted 
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pragmatically. When strict separation seemed impractical, they were willing to accept some 
intermingling of powers and adopt checks and balances, as, for example, with the executive veto 
and senatorial advice and consent on appointments When these approaches seemed unnecessary, 
as with the pardoning power and the creation of the vice presidency, they were willing to 
disregard them. For the deputies, separation of powers served not as a rigid rule, but as a 
functional guide, designed to help construct a working constitution with a workable executive 
branch.173 
                                                 
173. “Axioms alone, however, do not solve problems; specific calculations are always needed to derive the 
desired results. In practice, the entire enterprise of constitution making in revolutionary America centered on 
determining which forms of republican government were best suited as securing the general principles all accepted.” 
RAKOVE, supra note 20, at 19; see ADAMS, supra note 12, at 118-24 (illustrating this point). 
